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Financing of Public Goods through Taxation in a General Equilibrium 
Economy: Theory and Experimental Evidence* 
 
Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, and Shyam Sunder  
 
Abstract 
We compare general equilibrium economies in which building and maintenance of a depreciating public 
facility is financed either by anonymous voluntary contributions or by taxing agents on their income from 
private production.    Agents start with an endowment of private goods and money, while the government 
starts with an endowment of public good and money. All private goods produced are tendered for sale in 
exchange for money in a sell-all market mechanism. Agents' proceeds from sale are taxed, and they 
individually allocate their private goods between current consumption and investment in production for 
the following period. The optimal levels of supply of the public good, and tax rate to sustain it over time, 
are defined and calculated for infinite and finite horizons. These equilibrium theoretical predications are 
compared to the outcomes of laboratory economies when (1) the starting public facility is either at or 
below the optimal level; and (2) the tax rate is either exogenously set at the optimal level, or at the median 
of rates proposed by individual  agents. We find that the experimental economies sustain public goods at 
about 70-90 percent of the infinite horizon but considerably more than the finite horizon optimum.  
Payoffs (efficiency) is at 90 percent of the infinite horizon equilibrium level even when the rate of taxation 
is determined by voting. Starting conditions play only a minor role for outcomes of the economies, as 
efficiency and the stock of public good adjusts to about the same level irrespective of the starting level. 
These results contrast with rapid decline in provision of public goods under anonymous voluntary 
contributions, and point to the possibility that the social institution of government enforced taxation may 
have evolved to address the problem of under-production of public goods through anonymous voluntary 
contributions.  
Key Words: Public goods, experimental gaming, voting, taxation, evolution of institutions. 
JEL Classification: C72, C91, C92 
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Financing of Public Good through Taxation in a General Equilibrium 
Economy: Theory and Experimental Evidence 
Juergen Huber, Martin Shubik, and Shyam Sunder 
1. Introduction 
Given the prevalence and importance of public goods in society, ways of financing their 
production have attracted much interest.
1
 Game theoretic models suggest that egoistic individuals 
have little reason to finance production of public goods through individual voluntary anonymous 
contributions. Laboratory public good experiments tend initially to yield average contributions 
around 50 percent of the collective optimum, gradually declining towards 5-20 percent range. 
Although the averages rarely drop below 5 percent, many individuals make zero contributions. In 
addition to these basic results, theoretical and experimental work has explored incentive schemes 
for individuals to voluntarily contribute more to provision of public goods. Given the 
fundamentally dispersed nature of information and the difficulty of gathering such information in 
the hands of a central planner (Hayek 1945), devising decentralized schemes for provision of 
public goods through anonymous voluntary contributions has strong theoretical and intellectual 
appeal. However, these efforts have been only partially successful. 
There is no reason for society to confine its search for efficient solutions for this pervasive 
problem to only anonymous voluntary contributions. Institutions may evolve to address various 
problems of economizing through socio-political and economic processes of adjustment, 
experimentation, and feedback over rules, expectations, and conventions. It is reasonable to 
conjecture that the scope of such social evolution includes provision of public goods.  
Walker et al. (2000 appear to be the first to consider the efficiency implications of a 
combined common-property-with-voting allocation scheme in the laboratory. Their evidence 
suggests people cooperate more with perfectly enforced voting rules relative to a no-vote scheme. 
However, their common-property setting is quite distinct from the public good we explore here.   
Kroll et al. (2007) employs a more common public-goods setting and voting and reports that 
voting by itself does not increase cooperation; if voters can punish violators, contributions 
increase significantly. With perfect enforcement they find 100 percent contribution rates in most 
periods. While these results are useful, a tax of 100 percent is neither realistic nor desirable in the 
real world. We explore an economy with private and public goods where voting is used to 
determine the tax rate – the optimum of which is at an intermediate level, as is the consumption 
                                                          
1
 For a survey of the substantial pre-1995 literature on experimental gaming with public goods see Ledyard (1995). 
From considerable literature since then, we mention only a few. Fehr and Gächter (2000) consider public goods 
experiments without punishment for free riding; Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007) investigate how individuals' 
cooperative disposition and experience interact; Brandts and Schram (2001) consider voluntary contribution 
mechanisms for public goods; Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) consider public goods provision where the individuals 
have different marginal values for their private goods; Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2001) deal with public goods, 
tax policies and unemployment in less developed countries. Modeling in the last of these paper noted is closer to the 
spirit of our own emphasis on the importance of institutional structure  in the economy. 
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rate. Furthermore in contrast we reconsider the new noncooperative equilibria  when the voting 
mechanism is considered as a part of the new formal game. 
Evolution of institutions may take decades or centuries; we do not try to capture it in our 
model or laboratory experiment. Instead, we modify a general equilibrium model of the economy 
to include government and a full process description of agents playing both economic (market 
behavior) and political (voting) roles. We use a process oriented strategic market game in which 
the provision of public goods is financed through tax on private income. The unique equilibrium 
solution for any tax rate yields an optimal consumption/investment policy for each individual. 
However a general dynamic programming analysis of our basic model enables us to solve for an 
optimal rate of taxation for society as a whole, using symmetry of the agents in the model. The 
purpose of the formal model is to illustrate, at a high level of abstraction, some fundamental 
features of government control of taxation to provide valued public services (see Appendix C). 
Note that changes in the rules of the game, such as introducing a government that can enforce tax 
collection, or introducing a voting mechanism, can influence the existence and number of 
noncooperative equilibria serving as dynamic attractors. 
The dynamic character of experimental gaming requires full specification of the space of 
possibilities and updating mechanisms.  The formal model includes symmetric agents and a 
government to build and maintain the public good facility.  With a dynamic programming model, 
Karatzas et al. (2011) are able to establish the existence of an optimum size of the public good 
facility as is shown in Appendix C. In Appendix A we provide the explicit calculations for the 
special case we utilize in the experiment (for infinite and finite horizon economies). Figure 7 uses 
an Excel spreadsheet to illustrate the full payoff set and the optimum for consistent with the 
general model. 
We examine the model in the laboratory under two sets of conditions: (1) when the rate of 
taxation is exogenously fixed at the theoretical optimal level (which is practical only in a 
hypothetical world of an omniscient government); and (2) when the rate of taxation can be 
adjusted by a democratic process that moves on a longer time scale than the day-to-day economic 
process (tax rate set at the median of voter proposals). Finally, we examine the performance is of 
otherwise identical economies in which taxation is replaced by individual anonymous voluntary 
contributions specified in either percent of income or as money amounts.
2
 
There is a departure between the mathematical model and the laboratory game.  First, the 
pure dynamic programming solution is based on an infinite horizon with the natural discount rate 
                                                          
2
 Financing the creation of a new public good facility requires considerably more capital than paying to operate and 
maintain of an existing facility. The two may also differ in their political feasibility, especially under uncertainty. A 
comparison between maintaining the old Metropolitan Opera House in New York and building a new one in Lincoln 
Center highlights the differences between the uncertainty and financing associated with the two options. In the first 
instance the annual maintenance costs and revenues are reasonably known. In the second, the expenditure is large, 
and the revenue is uncertain. In the present model and experiment, we confine ourselves to consideration of 
financing the operation and maintenance of an existing public good facility in absence of uncertainty; smooth 
incremental additions to stock are assumed to be feasible. 
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β < 1 (see Appendix C).  We found it more desirable for the experiment to consider β =1 and to 
construct the stationary maximum flow solution that is consistent with the underlying economic 
model.  This is shown in Appendix A.  Second, in implementing an experimental game with a 
finite termination we are faced with the question of how to value the stock of public good at the 
end of the game.  With zero valuation, we expect that the maintenance of the public good facility 
will tend to drop off towards the end of experimental sessions. We used Excel Solver to 
numerically solve the dynamic program when the value of the stock of public good is zero at the 
end of the session. The results obtained from this optimization are labeled ―finite horizon‖ to 
distinguish them from the ―infinite horizon‖ results throughout the paper.  
The equilibrium of the game without voting is replaced by a continuum of non-
cooperative equilibria in a game that includes voting.
3
 One of these equilibria could yield an 
optimal rate. We have not solved for that equilibrium, and do not know the dynamics of how it 
might be achieved. Our experiment may provide some evidence on whether a vote-based 
structure for delivery of public goods may efficiently address the challenge of coordination 
among individual choices. 
Our 2x2 experiment has four main treatments and a supplemental treatment. In the first, 
we start with a given tax rate and the optimum stock of a public good facility (such as a road 
system) the outcome is contrasted with a suboptimal start (50 percent of optimal, presented in 
Treatment 2). The taxation is set exogenously at the level necessary to maintain the optimal stock 
of the public good facility in both cases. Information on the optimal maintenance level is not 
given to the agents. The basic model of tax-financed public goods is reproduced in Appendix C 
without proofs. In Treatments 3 and 4, the tax rate is set endogenously through voters‘ choice (at 
the median choice) once every five periods, starting with optimal and suboptimal levels, 
respectively, of the public good. The initial level of the public good is at the optimum (Treatment 
3) and at half of the optimum level (Treatment 4). 
In order to compare and contrast our results with the voluminous literature on voluntary 
anonymous contributions, we supplement our 2x2 experimental design with two sessions 
(supplemental treatment T0) which start with the optimal level of public good (as in Treatments 1 
and 3 above), but taxation is replaced by anonymous voluntary contributions towards the 
production of public good. In one of the two sessions, the contribution is specified in units of 
money, and in the other it is specified as a percentage of income of individual agents. 
 Whether central coordination through government-determined tax rate through taxes 
dominates decentralized socio-political mechanism to set the tax rate through voting is an open 
question. We suspect that the outcome depends on not merely divergence of preferences, but on 
                                                          
3
 When there is voting it is straightforward to see that with a continuum of agents, if all have voted for a rate of k% 
then an extra voter has no influence on the rate; hence it is an NCE. If (as is the case in the experiment) each player 




the technological understanding of the costs and benefits of the public goods involved. Such 
knowledge is implicit in our formulation. 
We find that these finite horizon experimental economies sustain public goods at about 
70-90 percent of the infinite horizon optimum level, and about 90 percent efficiency even when 
the rate of taxation is determined by voting. Starting with the optimum level, the stock of the 
public good declines to around 80 percent of optimum; but starting from 50 percent of the 
optimum, the stock of the public good rises to about the same level. The stock of public good 
tends to exceed the finite horizon optimum. These results from a general equilibrium economy 
suggest that taxation may be the social institution that has evolved to address the problem of 
under-production of public goods through voluntary contributions. The paper is organized as 
follows: the model is presented in Section 2, followed by the experimental design, results, and a 
discussion in the subsequent sections of the paper.  
2. General Equilibrium Model of an Economy with a Public Good 
We consider a version of Samuelson's pure public good (Samuelson, 1954) embedded in a 
parallel dynamic programming control process that has been solved for its type-symmetric non-
cooperative (rational expectations) equilibrium for any tax rate.
4
 The dynamic structure also 
includes a government and voting. In the first two treatments of these experiments we constrain 
the direct choice of individuals to the private production and consumption decisions with 
exogenously specified taxation levels. In the third and fourth treatment, individual players have a 
say in setting the tax rate through a voting mechanism. This tax rate, applied to their income, 
determines their contribution to the public good; they do not choose the level of contribution 
individually. 
The basic model involves the maintenance of a depreciating public good facility such as a 
road transportation or sewage system.
5
 In describing the experimental game we minimize the 
formal notation (see Appendix C for the details). The game has a government and n individual 
agents each initially endowed with a quantity of private good and money (a, m). The government 
is endowed with G units of the public good and M units of money at the outset. It also has the 
right to tax a fraction θ of individuals' income from the sale of private goods, and a production 
function that transforms its tax revenues into the public good government has as its control 
parameters an income tax rate θ on the individuals.
6
   
A move by an agent i in any period t is to decide how much money to bid (bti) to buy 
private goods in the market and, after she receives the private good from the market, how much 
to consume and how much to put into production for the following period. Our theory 
                                                          
4
 Formally with a continuum of agents we solved for any tax level; then after solving this set with a taxation level as 
a parameter we solved for the optimum from the point of view of a benevolent central government. 
5
 It also could be a wage-supported bureaucracy that provides a self-policing system for the economy. Although its 
cost could be one of the most important and earliest of costs of  public goods, it is rarely mentioned in discussions of 
public goods. 
6
 Even at this level of simplicity, given that production takes time there are accounting questions to be considered in 
the definition of periodic income and profits. In a stationary equilibrium the timing differences disappear. 
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approximates equilibrium as though the number of agents is large enough that they have no 
influence over price. We use n =10 in the experiment, ignoring some small oligopolistic influence 
that may be present. 
 A period begins with government in possession of taxes gathered in the preceding period 
in the form of money (M in period 1), and public good G from the preceding period depreciated 
by 10 percent. The n agents carry their after-tax money balances from the previous period (m in 
period 1), and the private good they produced at the end of the previous period (a in period 1). 
We use a sell-all market mechanism, in which individuals' entire balance of private goods is 
automatically offered for sale in a market (see Huber et al. 2010 for properties of the sell-all 
mechanism). Each individual automatically bids his total money balance b to buy the private 
good from the market. The government also bids all its money balance for the private good. A 
price p is computed as the ratio of the total money bid (by agents and the government) divided by 
the total number of units of private good available.  
Government as well as each agent gets the money bid by each divided by this price (ki = 
bi/p units for individual; units for the government) of the private good allocation. Each 
agent, being a producer as well as a consumer, divides the units bought between consumption and 
production. In addition, each agent receives the price multiplied by the number of units sold as 
his income in units of money. This money income is then taxed (sales tax if you will) at a 
uniform tax rate, either pre-set to the optimum of θ = 21.5% (in Treatments 1 and 2) or set 
endogenously through a vote of subjects (in Treatments 3 and 4). 
The n producer/consumer agents have a private good production function f(k)=80*k
0.25
 
with a one period production time lag, and a payoff function of the form u(x, G) = (x + G/4), 
with x being the consumption of private goods and G being the level of public good. 
 The government uses the k units of private good it buys to produce F(k) = 2*k
0.5
 units of 
public good which is added to the capital stock at the beginning of the next period.  For simplicity 
we assume that depreciation is a fixed percentage of the level of capital stock. The government 
carries the tax collected as money balance to the following period to buy goods.  
 In equilibrium the production of public goods precisely covers depreciation, otherwise the 
amount of capital stock changes. This describes one full period of the game. If the game ends at 
period T the terminal or ―salvage value‖ of left over money, goods and the public good are all 
zero. Subjects are instructed that the session will end with 1/6
th
 chance after period 25, 26, 27, 28, 
29, or 30.  
3. Experimental Design  
In a laboratory session in which the players make some 10-100 moves through computer 
terminals, the ―history‖ is compressed (only rarely expanded) in clock time. The clock or 
calendar time that separates the moves is rarely specified in economic theory or in experimental 
gaming. We hardly know if the specific duration of a move (denoted by , for example) 
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represents an hour, a day, a week, a year or is valid for all possible scales of time at once. The 
socio-politico-economic and bureaucratic processes of providing public goods consist of many 
interactions among policy-makers while they watch public opinion and battle, bargain and trade 
with the bureaucracy. However, the latter may expect to outlast its temporary masters—whether 
elected representatives, hereditary lords, or generals. In laboratory experiments economists rarely 
consider the differences in time scales of various public good decisions. In our experiment we 
take a small step to address this matter by introducing ―annual‖ economic decisions on 
production and consumption alongside ―quintennial‖ politico-economic decisions for choosing 
the tax rate, to implement at 5:1 ratio in the two time scales. 
The experiment consists of variations on tax rate and initial endowment with public goods 
in a 2x2 design (see Table 1). The first variation (choice of taxation) takes two values: 
exogenously fixed tax rate θ = 21.5% and an endogenous tax rate determined as the median of 
proposals from individual agents once every four periods. The second variation (initial level of 
public goods) also takes two values: 100 or 50 percent of optimal level of public goods as the 
initial condition. Table 2 shows the values of the parameters of the experiment: number of agents 
in each session (n) is 10; initial money endowment of each agent is 4,700; initial private good 
endowment of each agent is 217; their private good production function is 80*k
0.25
 and their 
single period payoff is the sum of their private consumption and 25% of the level of public good 
in that period. The initial endowments of the government are 13,000 in money. Public good 
depreciates at 10 percent each period, and the public good production function is 2*k
0.5
. The 
natural rate of discount is 1.The stationary (i.e., infinite horizon) equilibrium price is p = 27.67. 
Each individual should buy 170 units of the private good and consume 68.27%, i.e. 116 units, 
while the remaining 31.73% (54 units) are put into production to produce 80*54
0.25
 = 217 units 
for the next period. The government buys 467.7 units of the private good to produce 2*467.7
0.5
 = 
43.25 units of the public good – just enough to offset the depreciation (10% of 427 units) of the 
equilibrium stock of the public good. 
As shown in Table 1, Treatment 1 has an exogenous tax rate of 21.5% and initial level of 
public good at 100% of optimal (G = 427). In Treatment 2 the initial stock of public good is 50 
percent of the optimal level (G = 213.5). 
If the results for Treatment 2 show a tendency of the economy to move in the direction of 
optimum outcomes with respect to the stock of public good, prices, production and payoffs, the 
result can be interpreted to support the proposition that the institution of taxation is a viable 
alternative to individual contributions as an approach to providing for the appropriate level of the 
public good in society if the government is able to infer the taxation policy necessary to support 
the optimal solution.  
 In Treatment 3, the economy starts with the optimal level of public good but the 
exogenously imposed tax rate is replaced with a rate determined by quadrennial vote of the 
participants, i.e. a vote every five periods. Each subject submits a tax proposal and the median of 
the ten proposals is chosen as the rate of taxation applied to all subjects for five periods, when 
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another vote is taken. The agents therefore have the collective freedom to increase or reduce the 
provision for public goods by voting. In Treatment 4, the voting mechanism is retained from 
Treatment 3, but the initial level of public good is changed from 100 to 50 percent of the optimal 
level (G =213.5).  
 In two supplemental sessions, labeled T0, voluntary anonymous contributions for public 
goods replaced taxation. In one of the two sessions, individuals specified their contributions in 
units of money, in the second in percent of their income. 
We conducted a total of 22 independent runs, each with a different cohort of 10 subjects 
for a total of 220. All subjects were BA or MA students in Management or Economics. All runs 
were conducted at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. All sessions were carried out using a 
program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004). Average duration of a session was approximately 60 minutes. Average earnings were 15 
Euros.   
 
4. Results from the Experiments 
The main results of the experiment are organized and presented in Figures 1-6. Each of 
these figures shows a single measure of the outcomes of the multiple independent sessions of 
experimental economies with different subjects conducted in each of the four main treatments T1, 
T2, T3, and T4, as well as the supplemental treatment T0. In addition the figures show general 
equilibrium predictions for finite and infinite horizons as theoretical benchmarks to compare the 
experimental data with.  
 
Stock of Public Good (Figure 1) 
The top left panel in Figure 1 shows the time series of the stock of public good observed 
during the four independent sessions of Treatment 1 (with fixed tax rate of 21.5%, starting with 
the optimal level 427 of the public good in Period 1). Time paths of the stock of public good for 
each of the four sessions are shown in thin solid grey lines and the mean of the four paths is 
shown in a thick solid black line. Given the small dispersion of the four paths around the mean, 
the latter captures their central tendency well. Two thick broken lines chart the general 
equilibrium benchmarks—the horizontal line at 427 for the steady state or infinite horizon level 
of public good, and the curved line for the finite horizon level with expected ending stock of 
public good at 310.
7,8
  The same conventions are used to depict data in the other panels of Figure 
1 and in other figures.  
                                                          
7
 Since the end of the session was announced to be uncertain (1/6th chance of ending after period 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 
and 30), the finite horizon equilibrium predictions are given in expected values (see Appendix A). 
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In all four of these sessions, the stock of public good gradually but steadily declined over 
the 25 rounds from the starting level (G = 427) to the range of 355-402 and to an average of 381, 
which is 46 below the steady state level, but 71 above the finite horizon optimum of 310.  
The top right panel in Figure 1 shows the four runs of Treatment 2 with tax rate fixed at 
the optimal level (21.5%) but starting with 50 percent of the optimal level of public good (213.5). 
In all sessions of Treatment 2, the stock of public good rose steadily from 213.5 to the range of 
357-366 and to an average of 362 (with little variation across the four sessions). As shown by the 
thick broken curved line, the finite horizon optimum stock of public good rises from 213.5 at the 
beginning of period 1 to a high of 378 in period 14, and then declines gradually to 295 at the end 
of the session. The average stock of public good at the end of these four sessions is 65 short of 
the steady state level but 67 above the finite horizon optimum of 295. So far we can conclude that 
with the tax rate exogenously fixed at the optimum level, the stock of the public good converges 
near the midpoint between the finite- and infinite-horizon levels. This happens irrespective of the 
starting stock of the public good.  
In the bottom left panel, the six sessions of Treatment 3, with endogenously determined 
tax rates and starting with optimal level of public good (427), the stock of public good tended to 
decline over the rounds to the range of 352-404 and to an average of 371. This average is 56 
below the steady state optimum but 76 above the finite horizon optimum. In the bottom right 
panel, the six sessions of Treatment 4, with endogenously determined tax rates but starting from 
half the optimal level of public good (213.5), the stock of public good tended to rise to the range 
of 273-406 and to an average of 344 (91 below the steady state optimum and 49 above the finite 
horizon optimum).  
A comparison of the data in the four panels of Figure 1 suggests some differences but also 
strong similarities. The stock of public good shows greater dispersion across economies when tax 
rates are endogenous, instead of being fixed. Starting from the optimal level, the stock of public 
good tends to decline to the neighborhood of 370 irrespective of whether the tax rate is fixed or 
determined by the vote of participants. Similarly, starting from the suboptimal level, the stock of 
public good tends to rise gradually to the neighborhood of 360 irrespective of whether the tax rate 
is fixed or determined by the vote of participants. In 19 of the 20 economies, the stock of public 
good at the end of the sessions lies inside the range defined by steady state and finite horizon 
optima. The null hypothesis that the terminal stock of public good is identical across the four 
treatments cannot be rejected (pairwise Mann-Whitney U-test, all p-values 0.2 or higher). 
It seems reasonable to infer, on the basis of these 20 independent sessions of experimental 
economies that the stock of public good tends towards the range of 350-375, and this range seems 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
8
 In an unconstrained environment, one would expect the finite horizon equilibrium stock of public good to be 
exhausted to zero at the end of the session. Since the stock of public good depreciates at a constant rate of 10% per 
period, exhaustion close to zero at the end would require lower investment in early periods. The lower payoff in 




to form a domain of attraction for these economies. This domain is below the optimum (427), but 
above the finite horizon optima of 295-310.  
Finally, the two left panels of Figure 2 show in thin chain-dotted lines the time paths of 
the stock of public good in two Treatment 0 economies in which taxation was replaced by 
individual voluntary anonymous contributions. In these two sessions, the stock of public goods 
declined steadily and sharply to 147 and 170 respectively, which is much lower than levels 
observed in any of the 20 economies with taxation. These results are consistent with those 
obtained in voluminous experimental literature in which public goods are provided for by 
voluntary contributions. 
Tax Rates (Figure 2) 
The two panels in the top row of this figure are empty because the tax rate was 
exogenously fixed at 21.5 percent in the economies of Treatments 1 and 2. In the left bottom 
panel for Treatment 3 (with the initial stock  of public good at steady state level 427) the 
endogenously determined tax rate remained generally below 21.5 percent and seem to decline 
generally from range 17.5-22 (average 19.8) in the first vote to 5-22.5 percent (average 14.3) in 
the sixth and final vote. Note that the finite horizon optimal tax rate (broken thick curved line) 
declines from 25% to near zero because the terminal conditions assign zero value to the stock of 
public good at the end of the session. The endogenously determined tax rates do not decline as 
rapidly. 
Similarly, in the right bottom panel (suboptimal stock of public good initially), the endogenously 
determined tax rates remained generally below the optimal level of 21.5 percent and seem to 
decline slightly from range 11-23 (average 18.3 percent) in the first vote to 8-23 (average 16.3 
percent) in the sixth and final vote. The subjects chose higher tax rates to support a rise in the 
stock of public goods from a suboptimal level over time (as observed in the right bottom panel of 
Figure 1). In all 12 endogenous tax economies, agents vote to pay taxes higher than the finite 
horizon optimum in the second half of the sessions.  
The chain-dotted lines in the two left panels show the voluntary anonymous contribution 
as a percentage of individual income in the two sessions of Treatment 0. These percentages drop 
steadily through time until they approach the x-axis asymptotically. This is consistent with the 
results of prior laboratory experiments with voluntary anonymous contributions for public goods. 
Voluntary contributions are almost always lower than the finite horizon optimal tax rate, thus 
resulting in a rapid decline of the stock of the public good, as visible in the two chain-dotted lines 




Efficiency (Figure 3) 
The total points earned by all subjects as a percent of the number of points they would 
have earned if the economies had achieved the infinite horizon (steady state) general equilibrium 
outcomes is defined as the efficiency of these economies. Results for the 20 sessions are 
presented in the four panels of Figure 3 which parallel the layout of panels in Figure 1 presented 
above for stock of public good. Note that finite horizon efficiencies (shown in thick broken 
curved line) can exceed 100% because agents can earn a higher but unsustainable payoff by 
consuming more and depleting the stock of public good towards the end of the session. 
In Treatment 1 with fixed tax rate and stock of the public good starting at the optimum 
(top left panel) efficiencies started close to 100 percent and tended to decline gradually, albeit 
noisily, to the range of 67-91 percent and average of 80 percent. With suboptimal start 
(Treatment 2 in the top right panel) efficiencies are near 80 percent at the beginning as well as at 
the end of the sessions, with little drift over time. With endogenous tax rates and optimal start 
(Treatment 3 in the bottom left panel) efficiencies remain around the low 90s. Only with 
endogenous tax rates and suboptimal start (Treatment 4 in bottom right panel) do the efficiencies 
show a rising trend from low 70s to mid 80s over the 25 rounds.  
It is reasonable to infer that 80-90 percent is the domain of attraction for the efficiency of 
these economies. Surprisingly, given the prior results from public good economies with 
individual anonymous voluntary contributions, efficiency is slightly higher with endogenous 
choice of tax rate. Efficiency in the last period of T3 is only marginally significant higher than in 
T1 or T2 (Mann-Whitney U-tests, p-value=0.09 for both tests), while there are no other 
significant differences between treatments. 
The chain-dotted lines in the two left panels for Treatment 0 economies are hardly 
distinguishable from the lines for efficiency of T1 and T3 economies. While suboptimal 
consumption decisions tended to lower the efficiency of T0 economies, letting the stock of public 
good run down raised it at the expense of unobserved decline in efficiency of periods beyond 25 
(the end of the sessions). These two effects on efficiency tended to cancel each other, leaving the 
efficiency paths of T0 to be essentially indistinguishable from T1 and T3. Overall, the null 
hypothesis that the efficiency of the economies under the five treatments is the same cannot be 
rejected (with the above mentioned exception that T3 is marginally more efficient than T1 and 
T2). 
While the stock of public good, endogenously determined rate of taxation, and efficiency 
of these economies are overall measures of their performance, we can also assess the decisions 
made by subjects that led to these aggregate outcomes. In the following paragraphs we present 
analyses of these decisions.  
 
Total Production (Figure 4) 
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The thick broken lines for GE production in infinite and finite economies overlap at 2170 
except in the final period when the finite period production drops. 
Four panels of Figure 4 show the time paths of total production of the private good in the 
22 economies for the five treatments. In all economies, the level of production was near optimal 
at the outset (2,170), but declined over the 25 rounds to the neighborhood of 1,500 with 
significant amount of noise across sessions as well as across rounds.  A reason for this could be 
the choice of the concave production function (80*k
0.25
) in which the extra output from positive 
deviations from optimal input (54) is much smaller than the loss of output from comparable 
negative deviations. Thus, while the average input is closer to the optimum (44.8 units overall 
and 53.2 in the first 10 periods), average output is lower due to dispersion of inputs across 
individual subjects. Also, optimal production would fall sharply in periods 26 to 30 in the finite-
horizon benchmark. Thus, the decline observed in the experiments is not unjustified. 
The chain-dotted lines for T0 economies in the two left panels of Figure 4 are not 
distinguishable from the time paths of T1 and T3 economies.  
 Total Consumption as a Fraction of Total Purchase of Private Goods by Individuals (Figure 5) 
The thick broken line for GE (infinite horizon) is horizontal at 68.3%. The thick broken 
line for GE (finite) starts lower at 68.04% in period 1, rises steadily to 79.9 in period 24, and 
jumps to 79.9 in period 25.  
Four panels of Figure 5 show the time paths of total consumption of private good as a 
fraction of the private good purchased by the individuals (recall that the private goods purchased 
but not consumed are allocated to produce the private good in the following period). The reason 
for the steady decline in production of private goods (in Figure 4) becomes clear here, since 
subjects appear to have consumed a steadily higher proportion of their purchases of private good 
than the steady state general equilibrium demands. While the GE prediction is 68.3 percent, 
actual average of consumption of individuals ranged in 71-89 percent, with many economies 
exhibiting an upward spike in this consumption during the later rounds of the sessions. As 
suggested by the finite horizon equilibrium, subjects may consume more instead of investing in 
public good at the end of the session. Recall that subjects did not receive any value from the stock 
of public good at the end of the session and that they faced uncertainty about the length of the 
experiment.  
Two chain-dotted lines for T0 economies in the two left panels suggest slightly higher 




Total Consumption as a Fraction of the General Equilibrium Consumption (Figure 6) 
Figure 6 shows the total consumption of the private good as a percent of the infinite 
horizon GE consumption (recall that Figure 5 shows consumption as a percent of purchases). 
This percentage tends to be below the infinite horizon GE prediction of 100%, largely because 
the shortfall in production. 
The rising thick broken lines in these panels show the finite period equilibrium 134.7% in 
period 24, and 145.6 in the final period. The chain-dotted lines for the T0 economies in the two 
left panels show higher rates of consumption compared to the T1 and T3 economies. 
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
 Public goods decisions are made in rich institutional settings. British history of the 
―tragedy of the commons‖ does not offer much insight into how to finance the building of a 
network of roads or other public facilities. States evolved over centuries by enforcing weights and 
measures, commercial codes, accounting rules, law and order, and tax collection. In this study we 
take the structure of government to be able to provide these functions as a given.  We believe that 
economic anthropology is an important subject in its own right, but is only a distant relative to 
models of the economy starting with the assumption that a government with powers to tax and 
enforce taxation exists. 
We ran experiments to explore the suitability of setting taxes through democratic voting 
to provide for public goods. The results of the experiment suggest that the important social 
problem of financing public goods can be addressed by societies through significant reliance on 
the institution of taxation. Total dependence on voluntary contributions among large groups may 
be too unreliable a basis for providing services essential to their productivity, even survival. 
Voluntary contribution mechanisms have the inherent appeal of being decentralized, and thus 
insulated from tyranny. Taxation, representing centralized power and a centralized enforcement 
mechanism, has historical associations with tyrannical oppression. Democratic government and 
taxation based on popular voting attempts to balance the consequences of centralization. These 
experimental results suggest that such a reasonable balance is achievable for financing of public 
goods and services through democratic mechanisms.  
The basic intuitions behind much of the formal economic theory concerning rational 
conscious economic profit seeking behavior are reasonably good. However, most people know 
that a public good poses a socio-political choice problem that is different from a simple private 
good market problem. Institutional evolution favors structures that can easily be operated by the 
participants, and have appropriate time-lags and other stabilizing features to damp down swings 
and disruptions caused by transient passions. A well-functioning social institution, like its 
engineering cousins plumbing or electrical wiring, should be taken for granted almost all the 
time; continual attention to and engagement with it should be on the verge of being boring. 
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The present experiment examines the minimal institutional underpinnings of economic 
theory. Institutions carry the socio-economic processes and link the static models of much 
economic theory to economic dynamics. Many of the reported experiments on public goods can 
be interpreted as contributions to economic anthropology and social-psychology, in contrast to 
testing the efficacy of existing and proposed institutional designs in addressing specific problems. 
Evolution of institutions occurs over decades and centuries where history, context, learning, 
experience, tradition and innovation all matter. The extent to which one may make useful 
analogies, and draw valid inferences, from laboratory games lasting but an hour or two in 
radically different time scale and context remains open, and is worth mentioning here for caution. 
Contributions of experimental gaming to the development of an economic science should be 
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Table 1: Experimental Design 
  Initial Level of Public Good 
Regimes for Public Good Provision 100 percent of Optimal 50 percent of Optimal 
Voluntary anonymous contributions Treatment 0: 2 sessions*  
Taxation  
Fixed at 21.5% Treatment 1:4 sessions** Treatment 2:4 sessions 
Tax rate set by vote Treatment 3: 6 sessions Treatment 4: 6 sessions 
   
*Voluntary contributions specified in units of money in one session and in percent of wealth in 
the other. 
**Two of these four sessions permitted 0 inputs to private good production; all other sessions of 
the experiment required a minimum of 1 unit of input. 
 
Table 2: Experimental Parameters and Design 
Parameters   
Number of Agents n 10 
Initial money endowment of agents m 4,700 
Initial pvt. good endowment of agents a 217 
Agents‘ pvt. Good production function f(k) 80*k
0.25
 
Single period agent payoff u(x, G) x + G/4 
Session agent payoff  Sum of period-wise payoffs 
Initial government public good endow. G 427 (T1, T3) or 213.5 (T2, T4)  
Initial government money endowment M 13,000 





Natural rate of discount β 1 
Depreciation rate (per period) η 0.1 
Terminal value of public good  0 
Session termination  Announced: random between periods 25 and 30 
Actual: always ended after vote in period 26 
   
Equilibrium Outcomes   
Price of private goods p 27.67 
Per capita production of pvt. good  217 
Per capita purchase of pvt. good  170 
Per capita consumption of pvt. good  116 (68.27% of 170) 
Per capita pvt. Good into production  54 (31.73% of 170) 




Figure 1: Stock of Public Good in Economies Grouped by Four Types of Sessions 
 
T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum 
  






























































































Figure 2: Tax Rates  
 






















































































Figure 3: Efficiency of Public Good Economies with GE(Infinite) being the benchmark 
 
T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum 
  
































































Figure 4: Total Production of Private Good in Economies 
 
T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum 
  




























































































































Figure 5: Total Consumption as Percentage of Total Individual Purchases of Private Good  
 
T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum 
  


























































































































Figure 6: Total Consumption as Percentage of General Equilibrium Consumption of Private Good 
 
T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum 
  









































































































































APPENDIX A – Explanation of MS Excel Worksheets available online 
As supporting material for this paper we provide two MS EXCEL worksheets, one for infinite 
horizon, one for a finite horizon of 30 periods. In both worksheets all relevant input variables can 
be varied in cells E2 to E17. The respective notation can be found in cells A2 to A17. Especially 
noteworthy in the infinite horizon setting are the tax rate (E7) and the consumption rate (E12) as 
these are the two variables for which we optimized by use of the solver function of MS EXCEL.  
In rows 19 to 24 (22 to 28 in the finite setting) the sell-all market is modeled, with period 1 in 
column E, and subsequent periods to the right, up to period 20 in the infinite setting and period 
30 in the finite setting. Right below, are the productions of private and public goods, again from 
period 1 (column E) to period 20 (30 in the finite setting). 
Several graphs from Columns H to AD illustrate the results and their sensitivity to variations in 
the input variables. Figures 7 and 8 give screenshots of part of the respective excel sheets, which 
would be continued in further rows down and further columns to the right.  




The Graph in the top rows of columns I to N shows total utility as a function of consumption rate 









Here the tax rate (E7) and consumption rate (E12) are no longer fixed for several periods, but 







APPENDIX B: Instructions 
Dear participant: Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to any other subject for the 
duration of the experiment. 
You are one of ten subjects populating a small economy with money and two kinds of goods: 
one private and one public good. As subjects, you will produce, sell, buy, and consume the 
private good. The government (played by the experimenter) will tax the income of subjects (from 
sale of the private good) and use the proceeds to buy some of the private good, to be used to 
produce the public good. The tax rate will be either fixed, or determined by the vote of the ten 
subjects once every five periods. Your earnings for each period depend on the quantity of private 
good you consume, and the quantity of the public good provided by the government for benefit 
of all in that period. 
Money and Goods 
There is money and two kinds of goods in the economy:   
 A private good produced, sold, bought and consumed by the participating subjects; some 
the private good is also bought by the government and used to produce the public good.  
 The public good (e.g., a public facility) which depreciates at the rate of 10 percent per 
round. The government uses tax collected from subjects to replenish the depreciating 
stock of public good.   
In round 1 each subject starts with 4,700 units of money and 217 units of the private good. The 
government starts with 13,000 units of money and 427 (213.5 in half of the runs) units of the 
public good. 
At the beginning of each round, all private good produced in (and carried over from) the 
preceding round) is sold in a market. Thus, the initial private good endowment of 217 units in the 
hands of each subject (for a total of 2,170) is sold at the start of round 1.  
Money serves only a means of exchange in this economy, but it has no role in savings, etc. An 
amount of money is given to you at the beginning of the session, and any balance left over at the 
end of the session has no value to you. Each round all money you have (either initial endowment 
or earned from sale of goods the round before) is spent for the purchase of goods at the start of 
each round. No borrowing is possible. 
At the start of a period all money held by the government and individuals is tendered to buy units 
of the private good. In the first period 2,170 units are sold for a total of 60,000 units of money.  
Total agent and government bids in money = 60,000/2,170 (total number of units of private 




Each individual buys 170 units and earns 217*27.65=6,000 units of money. Your first decision is 
how many of these 170 units you invest into production for the next period, with the remainder 
being consumed this period.  Your money income (6,000 in the first period) is taxed by the 
government at a rate set by all subjects through a vote (see details below). 
On the left side of the Screen 2 you learn the total money bid for private good, the resulting 
price, the units bought by the government, and government‘s tax revenue (all of which is spent to 
buy private goods in the following round).  On the right side of Screen 2 you see how many units 
you bought, your spending, income, tax, and the initial and final money balances (the latter to be 
carried over to the following round).  
Screen 2 
 
Out of the units of private good you bought, you have to decide on how many you wish to 
consume, and how many you wish to invest to produce private goods to be sold during the next 
round. The following equation and chart show the relationship between the units you invest and 
the units produced: 
UNITS OF THE PRIVATE GOOD PRODUCED = 80*(UNITS INVESTED)
0.25
. 






The government starts with a stock of 427 units of the public good. This stock depreciates by 
10% each round, like, for example, roads deteriorate. To maintain or upgrade the public good the 
government taxes the subjects‘ income (from sales of goods) at the selected rate. All tax receipts 
are used to buy the private good and all private goods are used to produce new units of the public 
good according to the following function:  






































































All individual income (proceeds from sale of private good) will be taxed at a flat tax rate (which 
is either fixed by the experimenter in advance, or is set by the vote of ten subjects). In the latter 
case, every five rounds (i.e., at the beginnings of rounds 1, 6, 11, 16, etc.) each subject is asked 
to submit his/her suggested percent rate of taxation to be applicable to all ten subjects. You are 
free to suggest any integer number between zero (no tax) and 100 (everything taken by the 
government) as the percent tax rate. The computer collects the suggested tax rates from the ten 
subjects, sorts them from highest to lowest, and sets the median (average of the 5
th
 and the 6
th
 
suggested rates) as the tax rate for all subjects. The selected tax rate is announced, and it remains 
in effect for five rounds until the next tax rate is determined though another vote. (In half of the 
treatments the tax rate was fixed at 21.5. percent and no vote was carried out) 
Points earned 
The points you earn in each round are calculated as:  
POINTS = CONSUMPTION OF PRIVATE GOOD + PUBLIC GOOD/4.  
For example, if you consume 60 units of private good and the government provides 200 units of 
public good, you earn 60 + 200/4 = 110 points in that period. Both higher private good 
consumption as well as higher stock of the public good increase your earnings. Chart 1 and Table 
1 show the number of points resulting from various combinations of private good consumption 
and public good provision by government. 
(Insert Chart 1) 
History screen: 
After all subjects have entered their consumption/investment decisions, computer carries out all 
the calculations, and a history screen provides a round-by-round overview of the results (the 
accounting of public goods on the left, your consumption and production of goods in the middle, 






There is 1/6 chance that the experiment will last for 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, or 30 rounds. The actual 
number of rounds in the session will be determined randomly before we start, but will not be 
announced to you until the session ends.  
The points earned during all rounds are added up (column ―Total points‖ in the History Screen). 
Your take-home payment in euro is TOTAL POINTS / 200. For example, if the experiment ends 
in round 28 and you earned a total of 3,000 points during these 28 rounds, your take-home 
payment is 3,000/200 = 15 Euros. 
 




The formal model presented here is based on Karatzas et al. (2011) which
also includes proofs and further details. There is a continuum of producer-
consumer agents α ∈ I who hold cash mαn ≥ 0 and goods qαn ≥ 0 at the start of
each period n.
The government provides a quantity Gn ≥ 0 of a generic public good in
every period n. We assume that the government spends all its tax revenues
on the production and maintenance of the public good. The tax rate is θ and
θ̄ = 1− θ.
Each agent α makes a cash bid bαn to purchase the sole producer-consumer










The second term in the expression above is a lending limit imposed by the central
bank, if the agents choose to borrow. The p̂n is the bank’s estimate of the price
pn of the private good, and, in a rational expectations equilibrium, p̂n = pn, thus
in equilibrium the individual will be able to pay back her loan. This appears as
a partially “secured” loan. In actuality banks handle this feature by adding a
“haircut”. Although default is possible out of equilibrium, we do not model it
explicitly.
Concerning the possibility that agents wish to deposit and earn interest this
is implicitly covered in the selection of bαn, it is as though there is a sweep
program that gathers any spare cash of the individuals. In the theory below
and experiments above with 1 + ρ = 1/β there is no need for borrowing or
depositing in equilibrium.
In period n each agent α sells her goods qαn in a market at price pn and pays
taxes in the amount θpnq
α
n , (where α denotes a single agent of measure zero
whose holdings are indicated by a density).






n dα = θpn
∫
I
qαn dα = θpnQn (2)












is the total bid by the agents. Each agent α purchases the quantity bαn/pn of
goods and inputs kαn ∈ [0, bαn/pn] for production and consumes the rest.





of the private good all of which is used for the production or maintenance of
the public good.
Suppose Gn ≥ 0 is the quantity of the public good available at the beginning
of period n and that η ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate. Then the amount of the
public good in the next period is
Gn+1 = (1− η)Gn + F (kGn ), (4)
where F (·) is the government’s production function for the public good.
The utility of an agent α in period n is
u(xαn, Gn),





and the public good Gn provided by the government. For fixed values of G, we
assume that u(·, G) is concave, increasing, and differentiable. As before each




The government is regarded as a controller who moves first in the game. Its
actions are specified by its selection of its control variables, the interest rate ρ
and the tax rate θ. The tax rate determines the income level of the government
and thereby also determines its production of the public good. Furthermore
the goal or the objective function of the government is assumed known to the
agents. For example, the government may wish to supply some level of the
public good subject to some condition on inflation.
An equilibrium for the Model
A type-symmetric equilibrium is constructed in which money and prices may
inflate, but consumption and production remain constant.
Suppose that all agents begin with the same amount of cash mα = M and
goods qα = Q = f(k)+y. Assume each agent makes the same bid bα = b = aM
and inputs the same amount kα = k for production. Since the government bids



















− kα = aM
p







for production of the public good and thus produces the quantity F (θQ). As-
sume that the government holds the quantity Gn of the public good in each
period n equal to a constant G. Then






is the amount of the public good provided by the government in every period.
The utility received by each agent in every period is
u(xα, G) = u(θ̄Q− k, 1
η
F (θQ)). (7)
Theorem 1 Suppose that every agent α ∈ I begins with cash mα = M > 0
and goods qα = Q = f(k1), where f
′(k1) = (1 + ρ)/(βθ̄). Assume also that
the government initially provides the quantity G = F (θQ)/η of the public good.
Then there is an equilibrium in which all agents bid the proportion
a =
(1 + ρ)(1− β)
ρ
(8)
of their cash and input k1 for production in every period. In this equilibrium,
the government inputs kG = θQ for production of the public good in every period
thereby holding Gn = G for all n.
The proof given in Karatzas et al. (2011).
In this equilibrium money and prices inflate at the rate τ = β(1 + ρ) . To
see this, suppose that all the agents begin at mα = M and qα = Q and play the
strategy of the theorem. Then at the next stage, each agent has cash
M̃ = m̃α = (1 + ρ)(mα − amα) + θ̄pqα












A control problem for the government
3
A benevolent but controlling government will try to maximize the welfare of
the agents through its choice of the values of its control variables, the interest
rate ρ and the tax rate θ. Observe that, in the equilibrium the total discounted

















and Q = f(k1).
Thus the utility of an agent can be written as a function ϕ(θ, ρ) of the the
government’s control variables θ and ρ.
We illustrate the government’s optimization with an example.
Suppose f(k) = 2
√
k, F (k) = k, β = 1/2, η = 1,












































Since u(x,G) = log(xG), simple algebra shows that
ϕ(θ, ρ) = 3 log θ̄ + log θ + log(3 + 4ρ)− 3 log(1 + ρ) + C,










if θ = 1/4. This gives the optimal tax rate at 25%. It’s also easy to see that
∂ϕ
∂ρ
(θ, ρ) < 0
4
for all ρ > 0.
The example is fairly typical in that there is an optimal tax rate that is an
interior point of (0,1). This is intuitively obvious since a tax rate of 0 results in
no production of the public good and a rate of 1 means that the agents have no
incentive to produce the private good.
5
